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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
State Or Federal Standard Of Sufficiency
Of The Evidence To Go To The Jury
Wratchford v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co.1
Boeing Co. v. Shipman2
INTRODUCTION
Inherent in the American legal system, comprised of both federal
and state courts, is the problem of defining a workable relationship
between these two separate court structures.8 One of tche more diffi-
cult problems in this respect is whether a federal court sitting on the
basis of diversity of citizenship should in a given context apply state
or federal law. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 4 the landmark case in a
choice of law situation, has left unanswered several important ques-
tions. One of these questions is whether, in a suit based solely on
diversity of citizenship, a federal court should apply state or federal
law to determine the sufficiency of the evidence to go to the jury.'
A second, and related question, is what is the federal standard for
determining the sufficiency of the evidence to go to the jury.
1. 405 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1969).
2. 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1967).
3. See generally Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
COLUM. L. Rzv. 489 (1954); Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond: A Bird's-Eye View of
Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 TUL. L. Rev. 443 (1962).
4. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
5. Compare Rowe v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 231 F.2d 922 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 984 (1956), with Davis Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Norfolk
S. Ry., 204 F.2d 839 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 824 (1953). See 2B BARRON &
HOLTZOFr, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1072, at 367 n.5 (Wright ed. 1961),
where the law is summarized thusly: the federal test controls in the Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, the state test in the Second and Sixth Circuits (equivo-
cably), and the question is left open by the First, Third, and Eighth Circuits (no
cases in point in the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits) ; 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE ff 50.06, at 2348-49 (2d ed. 1968) ; C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTs 352 (1963) ;
Bagalay, Jr., Directed Verdicts and the Right to Trial by Jury in Federal Courts,
42 TEXAs L. REv. 1053, 1054 (1964); Feldman, The Difference Between the Penn-
sylvania and Federal Tests of Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence of Negligence
and the Choice of Law in Federal Diversity Cases, 72 DICK. L. REv. 409, 423-24
(1968) ; 43 MINN. L. RZv. 580, 581 (1959).
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WRATCHFORD
In Wratchford v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co.,' the fourth circuit
reaffirmed its holding that a federal standard is to be applied. On a
winter morning plantiffs' conservatee was found at the bottom of an
open highway drainage hole. His skull had been fractured and his
body was almost frozen. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant was negli-
gent in not having placed a grating over the ditch, or in not barricad-
ing the hole to warn potential pedestrians of the presence of the open,
unprotected hole. Plaintiffs' theory was that Wratchford stepped into
the unprotected hole and sustained his injuries. Defendant contended
that the circumstances gave rise to an inference of equal probability
that Wratchford slipped on accumulated ice and snow and slid, slipped
or crawled, after his injury, into the hole. It was assumed at the trial
that the Maryland standard applied - which the district court inter-
preted as demanding a directed verdict where the evidence shows that
the injury could have occurred in two ways, only one of which would
render defendant liable.' The district court directed a verdict for
defendant. Plaintiffs filed a motion under Rule 60(b), claiming for
the first time that a federal standard controlled. The motion was
argued before the district court and denied, the court expressing
doubts as to the propriety of its disposition as well as noting the
appropriateness of the case for clarification on appeal. While plaintiffs
did not take an appeal from the denial of the motion, the court of
appeals, noting that its consideration of this issue was somewhat un-
orthodox, 8 decided to give appellate consideration to the issue of the
proper standard as to the sufficiency of the evidence to go to the jury
because, as the court stated, ". . .when fundamental rights are in-
volved appellate consideration is appropriate, despite inconsistency in
the appellant's position."' The court of appeals reversed the district
court, holding that where jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizen-
ship, the federal standard is to be applied by the court in determining
the sufficiency of the evidence to go to the jury.' °
The decision in Wratchford is important, because, in addition to
bringing up-to-date the controversy among the circuits as to the proper
6. 405 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1969).
7. The parties were not in agreement as to the proper Maryland standard. The
district court relied on three cases for the proper Maryland standard: Langville v.
Glen Burnie Coach Lines, Inc., 233 Md. 181, 195 A.2d 717 (1963) ; Kettle v. R.J.
Loock & Co., 199 Md. 95, 85 A.2d 459 (1952); Strasburger v. Vogel, 103 Md. 85,
63 A. 202 (1906). For cases seemingly adopting a more liberal standard, see, e.g.,
Board of County Comm'rs v. Dorcus, 247 Md. 251, 230 A.2d 656 (1967); Acme
Poultry Corp. v. Melville, 188 Md. 365, 53 A.2d 1 (1947).
8. 405 F.2d at 1063. The question of the proper standard of sufficiency of the
evidence to be applied in diversity actions was raised for the first time on appeal to
the district court by plaintiff's motion under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The district court denied the motion but expressed the "appropriate-
ness of this case for clarification of the matter on appeal." No appeal was taken by
the plaintiff from the denial of the motion; thus technically the question was not
before the court of appeals; however, the court looked to the statement of the districtjudge expressing his hope of appellate consideration of the question and proceeded to
rule on the issue of the proper standard of sufficiency.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1066.
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standard to be applied, it enunciates several cogent reasons for apply-
ing the federal standard, reasons which cannot be ignored by the
Supreme Court when it faces the issue.
THE MARYLAND STANDARD
The court in Wratchford expressed a belief that the Maryland
standard requires a directed verdict for the defendant where an occur-
rence could have resulted with equal probability from two causes,
only one of which can be traced to the defendant. There would
appear to be two distinct situations, however, and in only one would
this articulation of the Maryland standard be accurate. The first
situation is where plaintiff's evidence produces two possible explana-
tions as to the cause of the event, only one of which may have been
caused by the defendant." In Larsen v. Romeo, 2 where plaintiff's
evidence showed that the automobile accident could have resulted
either from plaintiff's unexpected brake failure or from defendant's
negligence, the court, in directing a verdict for the defendant, stated:
[W]hen the plaintiff himself shows that the injury complained
of must have resulted either from the negligence of the defendant
or from an independent cause for the existence of which the
defendant is in no way responsible, he cannot be permitted to
recover until he excludes the independent cause as the efficient
and proximate cause of the injury.'3
The second situation arises where plaintiff's and defendant's evidence
produces different inferences.' 4 This was the situation in Board of
County Commissioners v. Dorcus,'5 a case arising out of an automo-
bile accident where the court affirmed a verdict based upon circum-
stantial evidence of negligence and causation. The court in Dorcus
phrased its standard in different terms:
The inferences drawn by the appellees from their evidence
were reasonable and probable, and the inferences drawn by appel-
lants were also reasonable and probable. There was, therefore,
in the case a direct conflict as to the real factual situation. Such
conflicts the trier of facts must resolve. 6
Although there may be some difficulty in those cases where the cause
of an event is unknown, it would appear that plaintiffs' testimony in
11. See Larsen v. Romeo, 254 Md. 220, 255 A.2d 387 (1969) ; Joffre v. CanadaDry Ginger Ale, Inc., 222 Md. 1, 158 A.2d 631 (1960) ; Moore v. American Stores Co.,
169 Md. 541, 182 A. 436 (1936) ; Strasburger v. Vogel, 103 Md. 85, 63 A. 202 (1906).
12. 254 Md. 220, 255 A.2d 387 (1969).
13. Id. at 226, 255 A.2d at 390, citing, Strasburger v. Vogel, 103 Md. 85, 91,
63 A. 202, 204 (1906).
14. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Dorcus, 247 Md. 251, 259, 230 A.2d 656,
661 (1967); Stein v. Overlook Joint Venture, 246 Md. 75, 81, 227 A.2d 226, 230(1967) ; Racine v. Wheeler, 245 Md. 139, 146, 225 A.2d 444, 448 (1967) ; Rea Constr.
Co. v. Robey, 204 Md. 94, 100, 102 A.2d 745, 747 (1954); Acme Poultry Co. v.
Melville, 188 Md. 365, 372-73, 53 A.2d 1, 4 (1947).
15. 247 Md. 251,230 A.2d 656 (1967).
16. Id. at 259, 230 A.2d at 661.
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Wratchford would be such as permit two inferences as to the cause of
the accident. Accordingly, coming within the first category mentioned
above, recovery would have been denied the plaintiffs in Wratchford
if the Maryland standard were applied.
THE FEDERAL STANDARD
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, as previously men-
tioned, proceeded to resolve the case before them in terms of the
federal standard of sufficiency of the evidence, affirming their earlier
holdings that a federal standard should be controlling. 17 At the outset,
it must be noted that one of the major problems encountered when
dealing with the proper standard for testing the sufficiency of the
evidence is the virtual impossibility of isolating the test which is applied
as the federal standard. In the first place, Supreme Court discussion
as to the standard for testing sufficiency is rare except in Federal
Employers Liability Act cases.' There is some doubt as to whether
the standard applied in FELA cases is the same as the standard
applied in other cases, and much of the confusion is directly attribu-
table to the Supreme Court itself.' 9 Often the Supreme Court will
cite FELA cases in non-FELA situations, and frequently in FELA
cases the court will rely on non-FELA cases as authority. The Federal
Employers Liability Act expressly imposes liability upon the employer
to pay damages for injury or death due in whole or in part to its
negligence." This proposition is recognized in Rogers v. Missouri
Pacific Railroad,2 where the Supreme Court stated:
The law was enacted because the Congress was dissatisfied
with the common-law duty of the master to his servant. The
17. Summers v. Watkins Motor Lines, 323 F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Burchan v.
J.P. Stevens & Co., 209 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1954) ; Davis Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Norfolk
S. Ry., 204 F.2d 839 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 824 (1953).
18. The standard applied by the federal courts has undergone a marked change,
which can only be characterized as one of increasing liberality. Compare Atchison,
T. & S.F. R.R. v. Saxon, 284 U.S. 458 (1932), with Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645(1946). See C. WRIGHT, FXDRAL COURTS 370 (1963). See generally Feldman, The
Difference Between the Pennsylvania and Federal Tests of Sufficiency of Circum-
stantial Evidence of Negligence and the Choice of Law in Federal Diversity Cases,
72 DICK. L. Rsv. 409 (1968).
19. See generally Bagalay, Jr., Directed Verdicts and the Right to Trial by Jury
in Federal Courts, 42 TrXAs L. Rsv. 1053 (1964). In Wratchford the court accepted
as applicable in a diversity case the standard enunciated in Lavender v. Kurn, 327
U.S. 645, 653 (1946). See also Moore v. Guthrie Hosp., Inc., 403 F.2d 366 (4th Cir.
1968) ; Ford Motor Co. v. McDavid, 259 F.2d 261 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
908 (1958). But see General Motors Corp. v. Muncy, 367 F.2d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 1966).
There is disagreement whether Lavender represents the proper standard for
diversity cases. Compare Crowe v. Hertz Corp., 382 F.2d 681, 687 (5th Cir. 1967),
with Jellison v. Kroeger Co., 290 F.2d 183 (6th Cir. 1961). See also Bagalay, Jr.,
Directed Verdicts and the Right to Trial by Jury in Federal Courts, 42 T-XAs L.
tev. 1053, 1065-69 (1964). There may be constitutional objections to the application
of varying standards. See, e.g., Simler v. Connor, 372 U.S. 221 (1963). See also
Aylor v. Intercounty Constr. Corp., 381 F.2d 930 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ; Wells v. Warren
Co., 328 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1964) ; Preston v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 749(D.D.C. 1958). Assuming that the federal standard is that established by the Supreme
Court in Lavender, it is likely that the Maryland standard does not meet these
liberal requirements.
20. See Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 507-08 (1957). See also
Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 398-405 (5th Cir. 1969).
21. 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
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statute supplants that duty with the far more drastic duty of pay-
ing damages for injury or death at work due in whole or part
to the employer's negligence. The employer is stripped of his
common-law defenses and for practical purposes the inquiry in
these cases today rarely presents more than the single question
whether negligence of the employer played any part, however small,
in the injury or death which is the subject of the suit ... "
It has been argued that the standard of sufficiency of evidence in FELA
cases is more liberal than in ordinary tort actions and that it would
be inaccurate to characterize the federal standard as that applied in
FELA situations. 23
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Boeing Co. v. Shipman,2 4
reached this conclusion in overruling its earlier decision in Planters
Manufacturing Co. v. Protection Mutual Insurance Co.25 In Boeing,
plaintiff, an employee of Boeing, sued his employer for injuries re-
ceived during the course of his employment, alleging that his employer
was negligent in failing to provide him with a safe place to work.
The question presented on appeal was whether the evidence was suffi-
cient to support the jury's verdict in favor of plaintiff. The fifth
circuit, sitting en banc, first dealt with the question of the proper
standard to be applied in diversity actions and, after concluding that
the federal standard should control, proceeded to discuss the federal
standard. In rejecting the FELA standard as the standard applicable
in an ordinary diversity case, the court went on to formulate its own
"federal standard." 6 A majority of the circuits, however, have re-
22. Id. at 507-08.
23. See Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 564 (1957)(dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.) ; Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 370-73 (5th
Cir. 1969); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 656 n.6 (1st
Cir. 1961) ; Gibson v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 246 F.2d 834, 837 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 897 (1957). See also W. PROSSER, TORTS § 34 at 186 (3d ed. 1964) ; Note,
Rule 50(b): Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, 58 COLUm. L. Rrv. 517, 523 n.47
(1958).
24. 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969). The earlier opinion of the fifth circuit is found
in 389 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1961).
25. 380 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 930 (1968). Here the fifth
circuit regarded the federal standard as analogous to the FELA standard, the reasons
given being identical to those expounded by Judge Rives in his dissent in Boeing.
26. "[W]e now reject the Planters principle and hold that the FELA test is
peculiar to that kind of case as a consequence of the statute itself and is accordingly
not applicable in non-FELA jury trials." 411 F.2d 365, 372 (5th Cir. 1969). The
court then announced the proper federal standard:
On motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict the
Court should consider all of the evidence - not just that evidence which supports
the non-mover's case - but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most
favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and inferences point so
strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that
reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motions is
proper. On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions,
that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men
in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the
motions should be denied, and the case submitted to the jury. A mere scintilla
of evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury. The motions for
directed verdict and judgment n.o.v. should not be decided by which side has the
better of the case, nor should they be granted only when there is a complete
absence of probative facts to support a jury verdict. There must be a conflict
in substantial evidence to create a jury question. However, it is the function of
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peatedly referred to the standard of sufficiency announced in Lavender
v. Kurn,7 a FELA case, as being the federal standard. Arguably
the language in Lavender, unlike that found in Rogers v. Missouri
Pacific Railroad,28 more closely resembles the standard of sufficiency
applied in ordinary tort actions:
It is no answer to say that the jury's verdict involved specu-
lation and conjecture. Whenever facts are in dispute or the
evidence is such that fair-minded men may draw different infer-
ences, a measure of speculation and conjecture is required on the
part of those whose duty it is to settle the dispute by choosing
what seems to them to be the most reasonable inference. Only
when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the
conclusion reached does a reversible error appear.29
The court in Boeing, however, rejected Lavender as being the
proper federal standard, seizing upon Lavender's language of "com-
plete absence" to support its conclusion that the standaid announced
there was typical of FELA cases generally. The majority in Boeing
stated that a motion for directed verdict should be granted not only
where "there is a complete absence of probative facts . . . [but] [t]here
must be a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question."3 °
In an extensive dissent, Judge Rives took issue with the majority's
rejection of Lavender, stating: "It is submitted that 'complete absence'
must be read in context with the phrase 'of probative facts' immedi-
ately following it; and, so read, whatever misapprehensions the ma-
jority may have appear unfounded."'"
The basis of the controversy between the majority and minority
centers around their understanding of the FELA standard. The
the jury as the traditional finder of the facts, and not the Court, to weigh con-
flicting evidence and inferences, and determine the credibility of witnesses.
Id. at 374-75.
Judge Rives, dissenting, found fault with the majority's formulation of a standard
in three respects:
First, the majority expressly overrules the Supreme Court's own sufficiency
test set out in Lavender v. Kurn . . . [t]he majority, in so doing, commits con-
stitutional error, for the Lavender test represents but one articulation of several
constitutional formulas used by the Supreme Court.
Second, the majority simply has no authority to "promulgate" any one
standard when the Supreme Court itself has prescribed a number of them ...
Third, I disagree with the new standard "established" by the majority because
it is at least misleading in its use of the term "substantial," if it is not erroneous.
The word "substantial," used in its legal sense, can equally well connote either a
qualitative or a quantitative meaning. . . . In closing, too, I note that, notwith-
standing all the variations which the Supreme Court has played on its sufficiency
theme, I have been unable to find a single instance in which the Supreme Court
has used "substantial" in any of its articulations of the constitutional standard.
Id. at 392-94.
27. 327 U.S. 645 (1946). See Wratchford v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 405 F.2d
1061, 1066 (4th Cir. 1969) ; Lebrecht v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 402 F.2d 585, 589
(2d Cir. 1968) ; Lones v. Detroit, T. & I. R.R., 398 F.2d 914, 919 (6th Cir. 1968)
Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 733 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968);
Dixon v. Pennsylvania R.R., 378 F.2d 392, 394 (3d Cir. 1967) ; Simpson v. Skelly
Oil Co., 371 F.2d 563, 567 (8th Cir. 1967).
28. 352 U.S. 500 (1957). See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
29. 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946) (emphasis added).
30. 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1969).
31. Id. at 392 n.26.
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majority in Boeing found that the burden of proof is substantially
altered in FELA actions, with slight negligence sufficing to take
the case to the jury. 2 Thus, to the majority, the sufficiency of the
evidence in FELA cases is far more liberal than in ordinary tort
actions. The dissenting opinion of Judge Rives, however, reasoned
that there is no difference between the standards of sufficiency being
applied in the two cases. He reasoned that the results in FELA
cases, which frequently are in favor of injured employees, are due
not to any more liberal standard as to sufficiency of evidence required
for submission of a case to the jury, but rather are attributable to the
distinct substantive elements of the tort. 3 The dissent's rationale was
that the standard as to sufficiency remains constant, but that the result
of the application of that standard varies with the type of substan-
tive claim litigated.
The majority would thus define "probative facts" in relation to
FELA cases - a showing of slight negligence; while the minority
would view "probative facts" much in the same manner as the ma-
jority's "substantial evidence." The primary difficulty with the formu-
lation of the federal standard as expressed by both the majority and
minority lies in defining the terms "substantial" or "probative." The
majority defined substantial as "evidence of such quality and weight
that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judg-
ment might reach different conclusions. . .. -"4 It would appear that
substantial in many respects is similar to probative as that term is
used by Judge Rives.
While the majority in Boeing rejected the standard enunciated
in Lavender as being the appropriate standard in ordinary diversity
cases, it can be argued that the majority failed to view Lavender apart
from its FELA status. While Lavender involved litigation under the
Federal Employers Liability Act, the standard there established by
the court was articulated in such a manner that it in fact comports
with later Supreme Court pronouncements in non-FELA situations.
The court in Boeing dealt with another aspect of the proper
federal standard as to sufficiency of the evidence to go to the jury.
The majority argued that there was no constitutional requirement
that the FELA standard be the same as that applied in non-FELA
cases.85 The dissent argued that it violated the seventh amendment
to apply a different standard of sufficiency of evidence to create a jury
question in FELA and non-FELA cases.3 6 The dissent based its
argument on the proposition that the FELA standard is a constitu-
tional standard, and is to be applied in all actions. Since an action
"under the FELA is a 'suit at common law' as that expression is
32. Id. at 370-73.
33. Id. at 392.
34. Id. at 374.
35. [Tihe Seventh Amendment . . . does not require, either expressly or im-
pliedly, that the test of sufficiency of evidence to create a jury question in a non-
FELA federal case be the same as in an FELA case. The tendency of some
federal courts, at times, to use overly broad language or to cite indiscriminately
FELA cases in non-FELA situations does not obviate this conclusion.
Id. at 373.
36. Id. at 384.
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used in the seventh amendment,""7 and since the seventh amendment
applies to FELA cases brought in a federal court,3 8 the jury trial
afforded litigants in FELA cases is the same jury trial available to
the parties in any other controversy before the federal courts. Reason-
ing from this, the dissent concluded that the role of the jury in FELA
cases is the same as in non-FELA cases and accordingly, submission
of a case to the jury is to be tested in all cases by the same standard.
The major difference between the two positions enunciated in
Boeing can be attributed to their divergent views as to the nature of
FELA actions. The majority was concerned that the application of
the FELA standard to ordinary tort actions would result in revival
of the "scintilla" rule. 9 The dissent noted that the "scintilla" rule
had been firmly rejected, and, as stated above, argued that the often
liberal jury awards in FELA cases were due to the substantive ele-
ments of such actions rather than to any relaxed standard of sufficiency.
Courts commenting upon the standard set forth in Lavender have
stated that this case constitutes an abandonment of an earlier federal
standard which was characterized by a stricter standard of sufficiency
of the evidence.40 In attempting to trace the evolution of the federal
standard it will be necessary to view the federal standard with respect
to two distinct situations.4 The first situation is that in which plain-
tiff's own evidence gives rise to two inferences as to the cause of an
event, and the second is where plaintiff's and defendant's evidence
produces conflicting inferences.
In the second situation, where plaintiff's and defendant's evidence
produces varied inferences, the federal courts have uniformly held
that the question is one for jury determination.4" However, in cases
where plaintiff's own evidence produces the inferences, there has been
a noticeable shift in the federal standard. In Pennsylvania Railroad
v. Chamberlain,43 where the death of the brakeman in question could
have resulted either from his own negligence or that of his employer,
the Court stated:
We, therefore, have a case belonging to that class of cases
where proven facts give equal support to each of two inconsistent
37. Id.
38. Id. at 386.
39. Id. at 372-73.
40. See Moore v. Guthrie Hosp., Inc., 403 F.2d 366, 369 (4th Cir. 1968) ; Planters
Mfg. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 869, 871 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 930 (1968); NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583, 592 (2d Cir.
1961) ; Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Postom, 177 F.2d 53, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1949). This shift
in the federal standard is alluded to in Wratchford: "The federal standard may once
have been the same as that which the District Court understood was applicable in the
state courts of Maryland, but it no longer is." 405 F.2d 1061, 1066 (4th Cir. 1969).
41. See notes 10 and 13 supra and accompanying text, dealing with the Mary-
land standard.
42. See, e.g., Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 94 (1930), where the Supreme
Court reasoned: "Where uncertainty as to the existence of negligence arises from a
conflict in the testimony or because, the facts being undisputed, fair-minded men will
honestly draw different conclusions from them, the question is not one of law but of
fact to be settled by the jury." This standard is found expressed as the federal
standard as early as 1873 in Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 663 (1873),
and appears to be the standard at common law.
43. 288 U.S. 333 (1933).
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inferences; in which event, neither of them being established,
judgment, as a matter of law, must go against the party upon
whom rests the necessity of sustaining one of these inferences as
against the other, before he is entitled to recover.44
Although this formulation has been followed by the federal courts in
the past,45 it would appear that Chamberlain is no longer authorita-
tive.46 Federal courts, when presented with the situation where plain-
tiff's own evidence gives rise to two inferences as to the cause of an
event, will, as did the fourth circuit in Wratchford, allow the jury
to decide the issue.
THE ERIE PROGRESSION
In determining whether a state or a federal standard of sufficiency
will be applied, it is helpful to review several Supreme Court decisions
dealing with similar questions.
In 1938 the Supreme Court decided Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,4 T
and later in the same year the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure4" took
effect. In Erie the Supreme Court overruled Swift v. Tyson49 as an
erroneous interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act,"' which had
engendered an unconstitutional invasion of state power"' by the federal
judiciary. The Court stated that there is no federal general common
law, and thus initiated the principle that in diversity suits, the federal
44. Id. at 339.
45. See Jones v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 113 F.2d 873, 875 (8th Cir. 1940); Truitt
v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 112 F.2d 140, 142 (5th Cir. 1940); Henry
H. Cross Co. v. Simmons, 96 F.2d 482, 486 (8th Cir. 1938) ; Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Co. v. De Parcq, 66 F.2d 678, 684 (8th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 680 (1936).
46. See Moore v. Guthrie Hosp., Inc., 403 F.2d 366, 369 (4th Cir. 1968) ; Planters
Mfg. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 869, 871 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 930 (1968); NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583, 592 (2d Cir.
1961) ; Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Postom, 177 F.2d 53, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See also
Preston v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 749 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 269 F.2d 781
(D.C. Cir. 1959), where Judge Holtzoff reasoned:
The conclusion seems inescapable that the decision in Lavender v. Kurn, must
be deemed to constitute an abandonment of the earlier doctrine that if the evidence
is capable of either of two inferences, it cannot be deemed to support either. The
case substitutes the principle that in such an event, it is for the jury to determine
which inference to deduce and that the jury has a right to draw either one. The
prior cases [such as Chamberlin] must be deemed to have been overruled
sub silentio.
Id. at 752-53.
47. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). The Supreme Court adopted the rules four months
before the decision in Erie, but Erie was decided prior to the effective date of the
rules. See generally Comment, Federal Rule 43(a): The Scope of Admissibility of
Evidence and the Implications of the Erie Doctrine, 62 COLUM. L. Rgv. 1049 (1962).
49. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
50. The act provided: "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitu-
tion, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall
be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United
States in cases where they apply." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92
[now 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964)].
51. 304 U.S. at 80. The constitutional basis of the Erie holding is the tenth
amendment. There have been, however, arguments that Erie is without a constitutional
basis. See Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of
Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALx L.J. 267 (1946). Contra, Hart, The Relations Between
State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. Rev. 489 (1954).
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courts are to apply the "substantive rules of common law applicable
in a state."'52  The converse of adherence to state substantive law is
the proposition, effectuated by the adoption of the Federal Rules, that
the federal courts are free to apply federal procedural law. 53 In 1945,
the Supreme Court stated explicitly what had been apparent since
Erie - there is no simple dichotomy of substance on the one hand
and procedure on the other. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,54 the
Court substantially redefined and modified the Erie principle: Erie
meant to insure that the outcome of the litigation in the federal court
should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules affect it, as it
would be if tried in a state court.55
The next important Supreme Court pronouncement was Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Cooperative,6 where the Court indicated that there are cer-
tain countervailing circumstances which limit the application of the out-
come-determinative test enunciated in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.5"
In Byrd, the Supreme Court was faced with the issue whether,
in a federal court, the state rule, that the defense of statutory im-
munity is a question for the court, must be followed. The Court found
that the state rule was not bound up with state created tights5" and
was not ". . . announced as an integral part of the special relationship
created by the statute,"5" but was rather "merely a form and mode of
enforcing the immunity."6 Recognizing nonetheless that by allowing
the issue of statutory immunity to go to the jury the outcome of the
litigation might be substantially affected, the Court indicated that the
independent nature of the federal judicial system outweighed the need
for strict adherence to the Erie doctrine, and held that the state rule
was not to be followed. Byrd has been repeatedly cited as authority
for following the federal standard of sufficiency of the evidence to go
to the jury in diversity cases. 6' Furthermore, commentators have
expressed their opinion as to the certainty of applying the federal
standard,6 2 and the Supreme Court has given every indication of
52. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
53. See Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (concurring opinion
of Reed, J.) : "The line between procedural and substantive law is hazy but no one
doubts federal power over procedure."
54. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
55. Id. at 109.
56. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
57. Id. at 537.
58. Id. at 536.
59. Id.
60. Id. See Note, Diversity Jurisdiction - Admissibility of Evidence and the
"Outcome-Determinative" Test, 15 U. MIAMI L. Riv. 444 (1961).
61. See Wratchford v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 405 F.2d 1061, 1065 (4th Cir.
1969) ; Lones v. Detroit, T. & I. R.R., 398 F.2d 914, 919 (6th Cir. 1968) ; Wagner
Tractor, Inc. v. Shields, 381 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1967) ; Dobson v. Masonite Corp.,
359 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Pinehurst, Inc. v. Schlamowitz, 351 F.2d 509, 513(4th Cir. 1965) ; Seaboard Fin. Co. v. Davis, 276 F. Supp. 507, 514-15 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
See also Denneny v. Siegel, 407 F.2d 433, 438-39 (3d Cir. 1969).
62. See note 5 supra.
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following such a course. However, the problem is still referred to as
an "open question.""3
As was pointed out above,64 the circuits are not in agreement as
to the proper standard to be applied. Several recent Supreme Court
cases provide a background for the situation as it presently exists.
Stoner v. New York Life Insurance Co."5 was cited in a footnote to
Byrd66 as standing for the proposition that a state standard of suffi-
ciency of the evidence must be applied in a diversity suit. Many
commentators6 7 have stated that Stoner does not appear to stand for
such a proposition, and an examination of that case leaves little doubt
that it does not. In Stoner, an action under an insurance policy, the
state court had held that there was sufficient evidence to create a jury
issue as to total disability. The district court, sitting without a jury,
reached the same result. The circuit court reversed, finding the evi-
dence insufficient to create a jury issue. The Supreme Court reversed
the circuit court, holding that under Erie the federal courts were re-
quired to follow the state decisions that the evidence supported a
finding of total disability. One authority states that Stoner is "merely
a peculiar application of the doctrine of 'law of the case.' "68 Later
pronouncements of the Supreme Court itself indicate that it has
seemingly discarded the notion that Stoner meant what Byrd said it
did. In Dick v. New York Life Insurance Co.69 and Mercer v.
Theriot,70 the Supreme Court has stated that the question is still open.
RIGHT To TRIAL By JURY
Regardless of whether there are policy reasons which would lead
the Supreme Court to hold that a federal, rather than a state, standard
as to sufficiency of the evidence should be applied, there is the pre-
liminary issue of whether the seventh amendment commands that the
federal standard be applied. If it does, there will be no need for the
Supreme Court to reach a decision based upon the Erie rationale,
for the Erie doctrine must give way to the explicit command of the
Constitution. Even if Erie was a constitutional decision,"' the seventh
amendment would still require application of the federal standard, since
the specific constitutional command of the seventh amendment would
prevail over the tenth amendment's reservation of rights to the states.72
The court in Wratchford based its decision on an attempt to
prevent the disruption of the allocation of functions between judge
63. See Mercer v. Theriot, 377 U.S. 152 (1964) ; Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
359 U.S. 437 (1959).
64. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. See also Whicher, The Erie Doc-
trine and the Seventh Amendment: A Suggested Resolution of Their Conflict, 37
TZXAS L. Rv. 549 (1959).
65. 311 U.S. 464 (1940).
66. 356 U.S. at 540 n.15.
67. See 2B BARRON & HOLTZOFu, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURZ § 871.1, at
15-16 (Wright ed. 1961); 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 1 38.10 (2d ed. 1968);
C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTs 351-52 (1963). But see 43 MINN. L. RMv. 580 (1959).
68. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 352 (1963).
69. 359 U.S. 437 (1959).
70. 377 U.S. 152 (1964).
71. See note 50 supra.
72. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs 350 (1963).
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and jury in the federal system, indicating that the dictates of the
seventh amendment would so require a federal standard to be applied.
Reliance was placed upon the Supreme Court's reasoning in Byrd,
where the Court stated:
The federal system is an independent system for administer-
ing justice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction. An
essential characteristic of that system is the manner in which, in
civil common-law actions, it distributes trial functions between
judge and jury and, under the influence - if not the command -
of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed
questions of fact to the jury .... 7
Thus, inquiry must be directed at ascertaining what the seventh amend-
ment commands as to the distribution of functions between the judge
and jury.
The seventh amendment provides that:
[I] n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall ex-
ceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and
no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
It would appear that the seventh amendment would require the appli-
cation of a federal standard in determining if a particular controversy
should be decided by judge or jury, as well as the standard of the
sufficiency of the evidence to be applied in that case. Where the state
rule as to sufficiency of the evidence to go to the jury is more restric-
tive than the federal rule, the application of the state rule by a federal
court in a diversity case would seemingly deprive the party, against
whom a directed verdict will be granted, of the benefit of a jury
determination of the issues to which he would be entitled were the
federal standard applied.74 This, of course, assumes that the federal
standard is, and that the state standard is not, in conformity with the
common law standard as to sufficiency of evidence to go to the jury.
This reasoning alone has been sufficient to lead many of the commen-
tators to conclude that the seventh amendment precludes the applica-
tion of the state standard. 75 This view of the seventh amendment is
seemingly grounded on the avowed federal interest in the jury trial
right, because if the state standard does not violate the common law
standard the seventh amendment would not prevent its application.
The Supreme Court has frequently articulated the view that a party's
right to a jury trial is to be jealously guarded. 76 Since there is a
73. 356 U.S. at 537.
74. C. WRIGHT, F4DZRAL COURTS 351 (1963).
75. See, e.g., Feldman, The Difference Between the Pennsylvania and Federal
Tests of Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence of Negligence and The Choice ofLaw in Federal Diversity Cases, 72 DIcK. L. Rzv. 409, 428--30 (1968).76. See Gibson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 352 U.S. 874 (1956) ; Jacob v. New
York City, 315 U.S. 752 (1942) ; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389 (1937) ;
Baltimore & C. Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935) ; Dimick v. Scheidt, 293
U.S. 474 (1935).
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strong federal interest in preserving the guarantee of the seventh
amendment, it would fly in the face of this interest to apply a state
standard which would defeat a jury determination.
It may also be instructive to examine the standard which pre-
vailed at common law for testing the sufficiency of the evidence to go
to the jury. This is so because according to one view, the claim of a
litigant as to a right to a jury trial is to be measured against the prac-
tice of the common law in 1791 when the amendment was adopted.
7 7
The leading case on the right to trial by jury is Galloway v.
United States,7 in which the Supreme Court reviewed the develop-
ment of the practice of directed verdicts:
Finally, the objection appears to be directed generally at the
standards of proof judges have required for submission of evi-
dence to the jury. But standards, contrary to the objection's
assumption, cannot be framed wholesale for the great variety of
situations in respect to which the question arises. Nor is the
matter greatly aided by substituting one general formula for an-
other. . . . [T]he essential requirement is that mere speculation
be not allowed to do duty for probative facts, after making due
allowance for all reasonably possible inferences favoring the party
whose case is attacked. The mere difference in labels used to de-
scribe this standard, whether it is applied under the demurrer to
the evidence or on a motion for a directed verdict, cannot amount
to a departure from "the rules of the common law" which the
Amendment requires to be followed.79
If the state rule as to sufficiency does not amount to a "departure
from the rules of the common law," it cannot amount to a violation of
the seventh amendment. The central problem here, however, is in
ascertaining what the state and federal rules are. The difficulty in
determining what was the common law standard of proof required for
submission of evidence to the jury is complicated by the fact that in
1791 there was no directed verdict."0 At common law there were
several devices for withdrawing a case from the jury. Among the
common law devices were instructions on the law, advice on the facts,
77. Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935). The seventh amendment did not,
however, bind federal courts to the exact procedural details of a jury trial in 1791.
See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) ; Gasolene Prod. Co. v. Champlin
Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931) ; Capital Traction Co. v. Hof., 174 U.S. 1 (1899) ;
Walker v. Southern Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593 (1897). See generally F. JAMgS, JR.,
CIVIL PROCEDURt § 8.1 nn.1-5 (1965) ; James, Right to a Jury Trial In Civil Actions,
72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963).
78. 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
79. Id. at 395.
80. It is settled that a case is to be taken from the jury where there is no evidence
on the subject. See, e.g., Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442 (1871).
It is also well established that a mere scintilla of evidence is not sufficient. See, e.g.,
Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 94 (1930). The most frequently encountered state-
ment as to the sufficiency required for submission to a jury is whether there is any
evidence upon which a jury can properly proceed to a verdict. See Guning v. Cooley,
281 U.S. 90, 94 (1930) ; Commissioners v. Clark, 94 U.S. 278 (1876) ; Pleasants v.
Fant, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 116 (1874); Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14
Wall.) 442 (1871) ; Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362 (1850).
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demurrer to the evidence, and involuntary nonsuit.' While the modern
directed verdict is largely an outgrowth of these devices, none is
directly analogous to the directed verdict.82 The modern directed
verdict is merely one of those devices by which the court can control
the jury, and it is subject to the same vague standards that were
applicable to similar devices at common law. It would seem, then,
that in applying an historical test, the Supreme Court will not find
any clearly enunciated standard for testing the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to go to the jury at common law. Rather, the Court will find
itself presented with a long line of cases which have established only
vague generalities. The futility of undertaking an historical approach
is summed up in the well-worn statement that it is proper for the
court to direct a verdict where there is no evidence on which the jury
can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party with the burden
of proof.8 3 This statement only begs the question, however, because
what is at issue is which standard, state or federal, is to be applied,
where the evidence points to two possible inferences, one exculpatory,
the other inculpatory. An attempt to isolate the common law standard
for testing the sufficiency of the evidence, and then to compare this
standard with the questioned state standard to determine if it violates
the constitutional requirements, seems futile. In addition to the above
reasons, the standards at common law, much like the standard for a
directed verdict, were not static, but were constantly changing, always
toward a more liberal standard."' This difficulty is equally true with
respect to determining whether a particular cause of action should be
tried by judge or jury. Here the historical test, to the extent that it
is still applicable, works without undue difficulty where the case presents
but a single claim for relief. However, modern practice has encouraged
the joining of both equitable and legal claims, and this has given rise
to situations that do not fit smoothly into the 1791 common law."
These difficulties have resulted in a modification of an historical test
as is aptly demonstrated by the Supreme Court granting jury trials
in cases where they would not have been available at common law.8 6
The Supreme Court, however, has indicated that the preservation
of the common law distribution of functions between judge and jury
81. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) ; Hopkins v. Nashville,
C. & St. L. Ry., 96 Tenn. 409, 34 S.W. 1029 (1896). See generally F. JAMES, JR.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.12 (1965) ; Blume, Origin and Development of the Directed
Verdict, 48 MIcH. L. Ryv. 555 (1950) ; Bagalay, Directed Verdicts and the Right to
Trial by Jury in Federal Courts, 42 TEXAs L. REv. 1053 (1964).
82. See generally Blume, Origin and Development of the Directed Verdict, 48
MICH. L. RZv. 555 (1950). But see Bagalay, Directed Verdicts and the Right to Trial
by Jury in Federal Courts, 42 TEXAs L. Rxv. 1053, 1058-59 (1964).
83. See note 41 supra.
84. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 395 (1943).
85. See 2B BARRON & HOLTZor, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 872, at
21-24 and §§ 875, 875.1 (Wright ed. 1961); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 352-56
(1963) ; Note, The Right to a Non-Jury Trial, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1176 (1961).
86. In Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), the Supreme
Court extended the provisions of trial by jury to a case in equity. Professor James,
commenting upon the case, stated that it is "cloudy and ambiguous and susceptible of
an interpretation which would go far to abolish the historical test altogether and
extend jury trial over most of the former domain of equity." James, Right to a Jury
Trial in Civil Actions, 72 Y iA L.J. 655, 687 (1963).
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is not the only constitutional basis for applying a federal standard in
diversity actions. The right to a jury trial in a federal court is to be
determined according to a federal standard,87 and the recent case of
Simler v. Connor8a held that the federal standard also controls in a
diversity case. Since the federal standard is to be applied in determin-
ing the right to a jury trial, perhaps it should also control the incidents
of a jury trial. The right to have a jury determine a particular issue
is part of the right to a jury trial, and it would be inconsistent to apply
a federal standard as to the existence of the right initially, and then
deny a jury determination by the application of a state standard."9
It has also been urged that to apply a state standard as to suffi-
ciency violates the seventh amendment command because it interferes
with the traditional role of the federal judge.9" The seventh amend-
ment directs that disputed issues of fact in a federal court be deter-
mined by the jury. The court, however, has the power to direct a
verdict,9 ' and the case need not go to the jury at all. The role of the
judge in a jury trial is equally as important as that of the jury,9 2
and part of the judge's function is to present the issues to the jury.
To require a federal court to apply a state standard as to sufficiency
would disrupt the traditional allocation of functions between judge
and jury, an allocation seemingly directed by the seventh amendment.
The Simler Court was faced with the issue whether state or
federal law is to control in deciding whether a controversy is equitable
in nature and therefore to be tried by the court, or legal and triable
to a jury." The Court held that federal law controls, basing its de-
cision in part upon the ground of uniformity of the exercise of the
jury right: "Only through a holding that the jury-trial right is to be
determined according to federal law can the uniformity in its exercise
which is demanded by the seventh amendment be achieved." 4 The
application of a federal standard in deciding the right to a jury trial
will insure that in every diversity case the issue will be decided by the
same standard, while the application of a state standard could result
in different outcomes, depending upon the state standard involved.
The seventh amendment's command that the right to a jury trial be
preserved would or would not be obeyed depending upon the state
standard being applied. The right preserved by the seventh amend-
ment to parties in a federal court should not be dependent upon the
87. See 2B BARRON & HOLTzor , FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 871.1
(Wright ed. 1961); Bagalay, Directed Verdicts and the Right to Trial by Jury in
Federal Courts, 42 TEXAs L. REv. 1053 (1964). But see Whicher, The Erie Doctrine
and the Seventh Amendment: A Suggested Resolution of Their Conflict, 37 TEXAS
L. Rv. 549 (1959).
88. 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
89. But see Feldman, The Difference Between the Pennsylvania and Federal
Tests of Suflciency of Circumstantial Evidence of Negligence and the Choice of Law
in Federal Diversity Cases, 72 DIcK. L. REv. 409 (1968).
90. 43 MINN. L. Rtv. 580 (1959).
91. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
92. See Baltimore & C. Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935) ; Herron v.
Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931) ; Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S.
364 (1913) ; Capital Traction Co. v. Hof., 174 U.S. 1 (1899).
93. See Bagalay, Directed Verdicts and the Right to Trial by Jury in Federal
Courts, 42 TEXAs L. REv. 1053 (1964).
94. 372 U.S. at 222.
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state in which that court is sitting. This right should be available in
the same degree to every party before the federal courts. The same rea-
soning could be applied to the standard for the sufficiency of the evidence
to go to the jury. If the federal courts apply various state standards
as to the sufficiency of evidence, the right to a jury trial will vary
with the standard being applied. If the seventh amendment requires a
uniform exercise of the jury-trial right, it can only be achieved by
applying the same standard in all cases - the federal standard. 95
When the issue of the proper standard to be applied in determin-
ing the sufficiency of the evidence is squarely presented to the Supreme
Court, there is available sufficient precedent dealing with the right to
a jury trial that the Court can in all probability fashion a constitu-
tional argument for a holding that the federal standard controls. As
the above analysis discloses, however, none of the seventh amendment
arguments commands the application of the federal standard; instead,
these arguments indicate that the influence of the seventh amendment
leads to the application of the federal standard.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Should the Supreme Court fail to resolve the problem in terms of
the seventh amendment guarantee of a right to a jury trial, it will
then have to resolve the issue in terms of the Erie policy. Erie Railroad
v. Tompkins96 and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York' 7 articulated several
policy grounds which require the application of state substantive law.
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Cooperative" and Hanna v. Plummer99 enunciated
certain policy grounds which seemingly militate against those requiring
application of the state rule. It is in light of these two divergent lines
of policy that the present question must be resolved.
The Erie decision was based in part on a notion of fairness, and
in part was designed to prevent the practice of forum shopping.
Guaranty Trust attempted to clarify some of the ambiguities implicit
in the Erie decision by showing that there can be no simple dichotomy
between substance and procedure. The outcome-determinative test
there laid down was intended to further the policy underlying the Erie
rule, namely, to "[discourage] forum-shopping and [avoid] inequitable
administration of the laws."' '
Byrd marked a turning point in the Erie progression.' 01 There
the Supreme Court explicitly stated that there is a limit to how far
the outcome-determinative test can be extended. In Byrd the Court
recognized that the application of a federal rule might have an effect
95. See, e.g., Planters Mfg. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 869 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 930 (1968).
96. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
97. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
98. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
99. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
100. 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1964).
101. See Note, Courts - Federal Court Procedure - Evidence - In a Diversity
Case a Federal Court Is Not Bound by State Statute Excluding Certain Evidence
When the Evidence Is Admissible Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Is Not Outcome-Determinative, 39 Trx.As L. Rxv. 680 (1961).
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upon the litigation, and went on to state what the considerations
might be for disregarding the outcome test. The countervailing con-
sideration enunciated in Byrd was the federal practice -f division of
functions between judge and jury. In the recent case of Hanna v.
Plummer, 0 2 the Supreme Court further elaborated on the limitations
of the outcome test. Hanna was the first case where there was a
direct conflict between a state rule of procedure and one of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.' 3 The Court was therefore required to
determine which rule, as to service of process, was to be applied by
a federal court sitting on the basis of diversity of citizenship. The
Court held that the federal rule was to be applied, and in the course
of its opinion cited Byrd. While the Hanna issue differs somewhat
from the question of the proper standard as to sufficiency of the evi-
dence,'04 the case demonstrates the importance, in any choice of law
question, that the court will accord to the federal interest in main-
taining an independent judiciary. The Court in Hanna was called
upon to meet the contention that to apply the federal rule would result
in a different outcome than would be obtained were the state rule to
be applied. The Court recognized that were the federal rule to be
applied, the litigation would continue, since plaintiff had satisfied the
requirements of the federal rule. On the other hand, were the state
service of process rule applied, defendant would prevail since the state
rule had not been satisfied. The Hanna Court noted that the Guaranty
Trust decision was expressed in terms of substantial variations in
outcome. In a case such as Wratchford v. S.f. Groves & Sons Co.,.. 5
it can be argued that the application of a federal standard as to the
sufficiency of the evidence will not substantially alter the outcome that
would result from the application of the state standard. If the state
standard requires a higher quantum of evidence than the federal
standard, and a party has failed to satisfy the state tandard, its
application will result in a directed verdict for his adversary. The
application of a more liberal federal standard, would, on the other
hand, prevent a directed verdict, and allow the issue to go to the jury.
The jury, however, would not necessarily reach a verdict that differs
from that rendered by the judge in granting a directed verdict. If the
jury renders a verdict which is against the weight of the evidence,
the court has the power to grant a new trial. 0 6 The fact that the
jury's verdict must be based on some substantial evidence, and the
power of the federal court to grant motions for judgment n.o.v.
and new trials, go far to dispel the concern that the application of a
102. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
103. The Federal Rule involved was Rule 4(d) (1).
104. The question of the validity and applicability of a Federal Rule of Procedure,
the Hanna court stated, is not to be determined by the Erie doctrine. If a Federal
Rule is within the power of the Supreme Court under the Rules Enabling Act, and
does not violate constitutional bounds by enlarging, abridging or modifying substantive
rights, it is the rule to be applied by the federal courts sitting on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction. Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1965). The discussion in
Hanna relating to the Erie doctrine is, therefore, dicta, but highly persuasive to say
the least.
105. 405 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1969).
106. F9D. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
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more liberal federal standard as to sufficiency of the evidence will
substantially alter the outcome of the litigation. Neither Byrd nor
Hanna overrules the outcome-determinative test; rather, they demon-
strate that this alone is not always the determining factor. While the
Court in Hanna discussed the outcome-determinative test in terms of
substantial variations, the court in Wratchford went even further and
indicated that the outcome-determinative test is not the appropriate
one for choosing the applicable rule for the distribution of functions
between judge and jury.1 7  Rather, the court stated, the general
approach of Byrd is appropriate for determining the proper standard
as to sufficiency of evidence to be applied in a diversity action.108
The court of appeals in Wratchford followed a line of reasoning
similar to that articulated in Hanna. While the Erie doctrine requires
the federal courts to apply state law defining and limiting the primary
rights and obligations of the parties, the federal courts are not bound
to follow state rules which are not so connected with rights and obli-
gations, where to do so would disrupt the federal system of allocating
judge-jury functions.0 9 The court in Wratchford reasoned that Erie
demands the application of those state rules which govern the conduct
and affairs of members of society, whether that conduct is later ques-
tioned in a state or federal court. The court stated that rules as to
the sufficiency of evidence to go to the jury are not concerned with
the ordering of affairs of anyone."0 This discussion of state rules
which govern the ordering of affairs of individuals is reminiscent of
the language of the Supreme Court in Hanna. There the Court spoke
directly to what outcome-determinative means:
Though choice of the federal or state rule will at this point have
a marked effect upon the outcome of the litigation, the difference
between the two rules would be of scant, if any, relevance to the
choice of a forum. . . .Moreover, it is difficult to argue that
[application of the federal rather than the state rule] alters the
mode of enforcement of state-created rights in a fashion suffi-
ciently "substantial" to raise the sort of equal protection problems
to which the Erie opinion alluded."'
Where a party has a choice of forums, one of which follows a more
liberal standard as to sufficiency of the evidence, he may choose this
forum in the expectation of obtaining a jury verdict. But the differ-
ence in the rules is not likely to be of such importance in the choice
of forum, since the jury's verdict must still comport with the evidence
107. Now, as is generally recognized, the question of the applicability of the Erie
principle cannot always be resolved by discursive analysis of the rule in question
in terms of its being "substantive or procedural." Nor is Guaranty Trust's
"outcome-determinative" test the appropriate one in selecting the governing rule
for the distribution of functions between court and jury.
Wratchford v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 405 F.2d 1061, 1964 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
108. 405 F.2d at 1064.
109. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
110. 405 F.2d at 1065-66.
111. 380 U.S. at 469.
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and because the judge still has the power to grant a new trial." 2
Furthermore, the test as to sufficiency is not bound up with state
created rights and obligations, and does not alter the manner in which
such rights are enforced.
Because of the absence of any clear guidelines by the Supreme
Court, it may be helpful to look to decisions in the courts of appeals
for an analysis of why one standard is to be preferred over the other.
Such an analysis is not too illuminating, however. Almost without
exception, those courts which have adhered to the state standard of
sufficiency have done so on the authority of Erie."' Furthermore,
several of the circuits which had previously followed the state rule
have, since the decisions in Dick and Mercer, declined to make a
decision, preferring to wait for a Supreme Court pronouncement. 4
Under the rationale of Erie, several courts have held that the question
of sufficiency is bound up with a cause of action, and is therefore
substantive." 5  Such a discursive reference to Erie is inappropriate
in light of later cases modifying the Erie principle. Following the
teachings of Guaranty Trust, other courts have held that a rule as to
sufficiency is outcome-determinative and therefore substantive."' In
light of what Hanna had to say about outcome-determination, it ap-
pears that these cases similarly fail to sufficiently appraise the problem.
The cases which have applied the federal test of sufficiency have
followed reasoning similar to that employed in Byrd.17  In those
cases which were decided prior to Byrd, reliance was consistently
placed on the reasoning of Herron, that ". . . state laws cannot alter
the essential function of a federal court." ' s Since Byrd, many of the
courts of appeals have relied on the "judge-jury relationship" rationale
there posited as outweighing the outcome-determinative test." 9
CONCLUSION
It is not difficult to understand why many courts have concluded
on the basis of the Erie doctrine, that a federal court sitting on the
grounds of diversity of citizenship must follow a state test as to suffi-
ciency of evidence. The application of a federal standard might
significantly affect the result of the litigation. Furthermore, it is not
112. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
113. See, e.g., Trivette v. New York Life Ins. Co., 283 F.2d 441 (6th Cir. 1960)
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have relied on Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940) in applying
the state standard. See, e.g., Rowe v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 231 F.2d 922
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 984 (1956) ; Cooper v. Brown, 126 F.2d 874 (3d Cir.
1942); Sierocinski v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 118 F.2d 531 (3d Cir. 1941).
114. See, e.g., Hanson v. Ford Motor Co., 278 F.2d 586 (8th Cir. 1960); Ford
Motor Co. v. Mondragon, 271 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1959). But see Gilreath v. Southern
Ry., 323 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1963).
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entirely improbable that a litigant will choose the federal forum when
he is dubious as to the quantum of his evidence. If the federal courts
are viewed merely as sitting as another state court when jurisdiction
is based on diversity, it is entirely consistent to require conformity
to state standards.Y20 It is submitted, however, that the courts which
have applied the state test as to sufficiency have not been cognizant
of those policies expressed by the Supreme Court in Byrd and Hanna
and relied upon in Wratchford. It is clear that recent cases have
indicated a change in judicial attitude. 121 No longer are federal courts,
when sitting on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, to be viewed merely
as extensions of the state judicial machinery. Rather, there is a strong
federal interest in the independent administration of justice in the
federal courts, and when the application of a state rule, not bound up
with state created rights and obligations, threatens to disrupt the dis-
tribution of functions between court and jury, the federal court should
be free to apply its own standards. Underlining this distribution lies
the seventh amendment which would seemingly require the federal
courts to preserve the right of trial by jury as it existed at common
law. Although inroads have been made upon the historical test, the
seventh amendment has taken on new life as the federal courts seek
to uphold their independence by applying a federal standard which
will determine the type of trial to be afforded litigants as well as the
standard of sufficiency to be applied at that trial.
The better reasoned approach, in light of Byrd and Hanna, is
that adopted by the fourth circuit in Wratchford v. S.J. Groves &
Co. 2 2 There the court reiterated the strong federal interest favoring
jury determinations, an interest which the court deemed sufficient to
outweigh state interests. Furthermore, the court spoke in terms that
more nearly adopted the test of Hanna that outcome-determination is
to be tested at an earlier time, at a point where an individual "orders
his affairs." The court's ultimate reliance was on the approach formu-
lated by the Supreme Court itself in Byrd - the federal interest in
the relationship between judge and jury. If and when the Supreme
Court is called upon to determine which is the proper standard to be
applied, it would be consistent with its decisions in Byrd and Hanna
if it follows the reasoning of Wratchford.
120. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
121. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
122. 405 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1969).
